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5.1 Introduction
Concentrated ownership has been an important feature of the Indian
private sector for the past seven decades. In this respect, India is no diﬀer-
ent from several other countries, including Canada, France, Germany,
Japan, Italy, and Sweden. However, we show that, unlike in these countries,
the identity of the primary families responsible for the concentrated owner-
ship changes dramatically over time. In fact, by some measures the changes
are even more dramatic than in a comparable set of U.S. data.
Concentrated ownership exists at any point in time because of institu-
tional voids, the absence of specialized intermediaries in capital markets
(Khanna and Palepu 1997, 2000c). However, if these concentrated owners
are not exclusively, or even primarily, engaged in rent-seeking and entry-
deterring behavior, there is no intrinsic reason why concentrated owner-
ship is inimical to competition. Indeed, as a response to competition, we
argue that at least some Indian families—the concentrated owners in ques-
tion—have consistently tried to use their business group structures to
launch new ventures. In the process they have either failed—hence the
turnover in identity—or reinvented themselves.
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All errors remain our own.Further, family-owned business groups, typically diversiﬁed over several
industries, can coexist with specialist ﬁrms focused on a particular indus-
try. We demonstrate this through an examination of the history of India’s
globally competitive software industry. This is an intriguing setting in
which to explore the role of concentrated ownership since it is the setting
least hospitable to the advantages that groups might have. We argue that
groups’ generally advantageous access to capital and talent through inter-
nal markets—when external markets do not work as well—oﬀers less of an
advantage, if any, in this setting. Here groups are also least able to inﬂuence
regulations, since the sector is one of the few left untouched by vestiges of
India’s famed regulatory miasma, the License Raj. Yet it turns out that
concentrated ownership, in the guise of business groups, plays a deﬁning
and prominent role even in this inhospitable setting, and does so in a way
that is not inimical to entry from de novo entrepreneurs. We interpret the
privately successful and socially useful persistence of groups in the soft-
ware industry as a lower bound on the persistence of concentrated owner-
ship in the economy writ large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 begins with a
sweeping overview of dominant business groups in India over the past cen-
tury. We show that, while particular families have acted as concentrated
owners at each of three points in time in the past seven decades, the iden-
tity of these families has changed drastically over this time period. We then
consider two, not mutually exclusive, explanations for the persistence of
concentrated ownership. The ﬁrst (section 5.3) is political relationships be-
tween dominant families and the power structure. The second (section 5.4)
is a process of entrepreneurship by the dominant families. From these sec-
tions we conclude that it is diﬃcult to tell a story of concentrated owner-
ship resulting purely in stasis and rent seeking. Section 5.5 characterizes
changes in India during the last decade as moving toward less regulation
and government intervention and toward freer markets. Even in this set-
ting, we point out that family-based business groups continue to thrive. Fi-
nally, in section 5.6, we study the software industry.
5.2 A Brief History of Corporate Ownership in India
While there has been organized economic activity in India for hundreds
of years, it was relatively fragmented until the advent of the British Raj.
Under the Mughals, from approximately 1100 AD to 1650 AD, there was
only a semblance of a “national market.” The Mughals were content with
tax revenues and tributes that they received as a result of their power and
therefore did not rely on the merchant classes. The fragmentation and de-
mise of the Mughal empire marked the advent and coexistence of dozens
of smaller principalities, each of whom came to rely on local merchants
284 Tarun Khanna and Krishna G. Palepuand local ﬁnanciers to sustain their princely states. Thus were created the
nuclei of several prominent family businesses.
The British empire gradually ﬁlled the void left by the Mughals. And
British merchants set up trading businesses in India after the East India
Company lost its monopoly on trade with India, giving rise to the creation
of several large trading houses.
Table 5.1 oﬀers a bird’s-eye view of the diﬀerent factors underlying the
emergence of family-based business groups over the past century. We list
representative business groups that arose in each of four diﬀerent time pe-
riods (though the Tata and Birla groups predate 1900), as well as a generic
factor that described the rise of that type of group at that time.
By the early 1900s, in addition to the British trading houses, a number of
indigenous business groups had come into prominence. Whether this hap-
pened in an atmosphere inimical to the rise of indigenous enterprise
(Swamy 1979), indiﬀerent to it (Das 2000, chap. 5), or supportive of it (Fer-
guson 2002) is a matter of continuing controversy.
Subsequently, the Indian economy underwent several phases of major
structural changes after India achieved independence from Britain in 1947.
In the ﬁrst phase, in the 1950s, the assets controlled by the British trading
houses were transferred to Indian owners. In the second phase, from the
late 1950s through the 1970s, the Indian government intervened in the
economy through a variety of measures, which collectively came to be
known as the “Licence Raj.” Finally, there was an economic reform era,
which began with small steps of deregulation in the 1980s and picked up
speed in the 1990s following a major economic crisis in 1991.
The next two subsections show that concentrated ownership persisted in
India over several decades but that the identity of the concentrated owners
changed over time quite drastically.
5.2.1 The Persistence of Concentrated Ownership
Remarkably, while the economy was governed by these signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent regimes over time, family business groups continued to dominate
the Indian corporate landscape. Table 5.2 shows comparative statistics on
the Indian state-owned enterprises (SOEs, or public-sector companies)
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Table 5.1 Origin of concentrated ownership over the years
1900s 1950s 1960s 1990s
Period Preindependence Postindependence License Raj Liberalization
Representative  Tata, Birla Goenka, Khaitan Ambani Wipro/Infosys
business group Ranbaxy/DRL
Factor underlying  Ethnic community Transfer of assets Playing the license  Advent of 
rise game marketsand exchange-listed private-sector companies, and multinational compa-
nies (MNCs) operating in India, as of 1993.1The ratio of number of traded
private-sector companies to state-owned companies was approximately
seventeen to one. Thus, there were far more traded private-sector compa-
nies than public-sector companies. However, public-sector companies
were on average signiﬁcantly larger than traded private-sector companies.
Revenues of all traded private-sector companies were only 1.5 times the
revenues of state-owned companies; similarly, assets of traded private-
sector companies were only 1.2 times the assets held by the public-sector
companies. More strikingly, the total amount of equity capital in traded
private-sector companies was only 0.51 times the equity in public-sector
companies. Thus, private-sector companies, while large in number, were
more fragmented and relied on far less equity investment relative to the
public-sector companies.
Table 5.2 also compares the traded Indian private-sector companies with
multinational companies operating in India as of 1993. For each MNC
operating in India, there were approximately seventeen exchange-listed
private-sector companies. Domestic private companies were 4.3 times
larger than MNCs in sales, 9 times in terms of assets, and 6.7 times in terms
of equity. Thus, MNCs played a relatively minor role in the Indian corpo-
rate sector as of 1993.
Within the indigenous private sector, a distinction should be drawn be-
tween group-aﬃliated companies and unaﬃliated companies. The term
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Table 5.2 Comparison of Indian public sector, private sector, and multinational
corporations, 1993
Private sector vs.  Indian private sector vs. 
Expressed in ratio public sectora all foreign companiesb





Source: Author’s calculations from a database maintained by the Center for Monitoring the
Indian Economy (CMIE), Bombay, India. Found in Tarun Khanna, “Modern India,” HBS
Case No. 979-108 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1997, p. 7).
aThe private sector is composed of Indian group-aﬃliated ﬁrms (IG) and Indian nongroup
aﬃliated ﬁrms (IN). The public sector is composed of central and state government owned
ﬁrms (P). This column depicts, for each category, the ratio (IG  IN)/P (i.e., there are 16.92
times as many companies in the private sector as there are in the public sector, but total sec-
tor sales are only 1.53 times greater than total public-sector sales).
bThis column depicts the Indian private sector relative to foreign ﬁrms (F), i.e., the ratio (IG
IN)/F.
1. This date is drawn from Khanna (1997).group deserves discussion. Hazari (1966), in a classic study of Indian busi-
ness groups, deﬁned a group as the “area over which a decision-making au-
thority holds sway” (p. 7). The decision-making authority in question was
almost always a family, though it could be a close-knit ethnic community
as well. The area of control in eﬀect was almost always a very diversiﬁed
range of businesses. Hazari started his work by saying that it was “based on
the proposition that the business group, not the individual joint stock com-
pany, is the unit of decision and, therefore, of economic power” (see his
preface). Earlier work concurred. For example, another inﬂuential study
opined that the study of concentration of economy power is “unreal if di-
vorced from a study of communities” (Gadgil 1951, p. 29; the reference is
to ethnic communities).2 Hazari’s study provided an inﬂuential evaluation
of the extent to which business groups had exercised monopoly power (he
concluded that they had). Subsequent regulators and policymakers (e.g.,
Dutt Report 1969) built on this work to demonstrate that the control that
Hazari used as the deﬁning feature of groups was often exercised through
nonequity channels—for example, through family ties or through manip-
ulation of the boards of directors.
In 1993, a total of 1,113 group companies were publicly listed on one of
India’s several stock exchanges. Postindependent India also gave birth to
a large number of new companies that went on to become publicly listed
on the country’s stock exchanges. In 1993, there were 1,539 publicly listed
nongroup companies. These companies were in part a result of the govern-
ment’s policy of restricting existing companies from expanding their ca-
pacity. Promoters of these companies were also able to launch these busi-
nesses with relatively small amounts of own equity, thanks to the access to
capital from state-owned ﬁnancial institutions and public capital markets.
Table 5.3 compares group and nongroup companies listed on the Bom-
bay Stock Exchange (BSE) as of 1993.3 The sample consists of 567 group
ﬁrms and 437 nongroup ﬁrms for which the necessary data were available.
The group aﬃliates are members of 252 diﬀerent groups. Ninety-ﬁve per-
cent of the groups have ﬁve or fewer aﬃliates traded on the BSE, and the
largest group (the Tata group) has twenty-one aﬃliated companies traded
on the BSE. The mean (median) sales of group aﬃliates is 1,411 (666) mil-
lion Indian rupees. This is signiﬁcantly larger than the mean (median) sales
of unaﬃliated ﬁrms, which is 366 (217) million rupees. The mean (median)
age of group ﬁrms, which is 28.3 (22) years, is also signiﬁcantly larger than
mean (median) age of unaﬃliated ﬁrms. The mean (median) Tobin’s q for
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2. In recent work, Khanna and Rivkin (2002) have demonstrated econometrically that
business groups in Chile can, at best, be identiﬁed only partially on the basis of equity inter-
locks. Director ties and common owner ties play an important role in delineating what
Chileans (regulators and participants in ﬁnancial markets) deem to meaningfully be part of a
business group. Thus control is exercised, de facto, in ways very similar to India.
3. These data are from Khanna and Palepu (2000).group ﬁrms was 1.39 (1.14), insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mean (me-
dian) value of 1.37 (1.06) for the nongroup ﬁrms.
The total sample has the following mean (median) ownership structure:
foreign institutions, 8.9 (1.6) percent; domestic institutions, 13.9 (10.2) per-
cent; insiders, 27.1 (26.5) percent; directors, 9.4 (3.4) percent; top ﬁfty
owners excluding the above categories, 6.21 (4.0) percent. The remainder
is held by dispersed shareholders. Relative to unaﬃliated ﬁrms, group
ﬁrms, on average, have signiﬁcantly higher percentages of foreign and do-
mestic institutional ownership, and higher insider ownership.
In summary, the Indian corporate sector as of the early 1990s had the
following proﬁle: a little more than 100 relatively large state-owned enter-
prises and more than 2,500 smaller publicly traded private-sector compa-
nies, roughly equally split between group aﬃliated and nongroup compa-
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Table 5.3 Comparison of group and nongroup ﬁrms listed on the Bombay Stock
Exchange in 1993
Group ﬁrms Nongroup ﬁrms
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Sales (millions of rupees) 1,411 666 366 217
Age (years) 28.3 22 19.8 14
Tobin’s q 1.39 1.14 1.37 1.06
Ownership by foreign 
institutional investors (%) 10.1 2.3 7.4 0.9
Ownership by Indian 
institutional investors (%) 15.6 13.3 11.3 6.5
Ownership by insiders (%) 31.9 31.3 20.8 17.1
Directors’ ownership (%) 5.7 1.1 14.2 10.7
Top ﬁfty owners excluding 
the above categories (%) 4.9 3.2 7.6 5
No. of ﬁrms 567 567 437 437
Source:Khanna and Palepu 2000a, p. 276. Data obtained from the Center for Monitoring the
Indian Economy (CMIE) for 567 aﬃliates of 252 diﬀerent groups and for 437 unaﬃliated
ﬁrms traded on the BSE.
Notes: The summary statistics in this table are based on 1993 values. Tobin’s q is deﬁned as
(market value of equity  book value of preferred stock  book value of debt)/(book value
of assets). Sales are measured in millions of rupees, with an approximate exchange rate at this
time of U.S. $1.00  Rs 30.00. Age measures number of years since incorporation. Foreign
institutional ownership aggregates ownership of foreign corporations as well as that of for-
eign ﬁnancial intermediaries. Domestic institutional ownership aggregates ownership in the
hands of all state-run ﬁnancial intermediaries. Insider ownership includes the stakes held by
group family members and by other group ﬁrms and measures stakes held by insiders for
nongroup ﬁrms. Directors’ ownership captures the ownership of nonfamily directors. Top
ﬁfty ownership captures the largest shareholders not included in the aforementioned cate-
gories. Group membership is based on deﬁnitions of groups from CMIE (see text of paper for
comments). The mean and median values for all the variables except for the mean value of To-
bin’s q and change in Tobin’s q are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the group and nongroup
ﬁrms at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.nies. In the private sector, companies aﬃliated with business groups, with
concentrated family ownership, accounted for a substantial proportion of
assets.
5.2.2 The Lack of Persistence of the Identity of Concentrated Owners
While there has been a signiﬁcant persistence in the phenomenon of
concentrated family ownership in India over much of the twentieth cen-
tury, there was less persistence in the actual composition of the top busi-
ness groups themselves. The Tata group remained the largest Indian group
during the entire sixty-year period on which we present data below. But
other leading groups from the pre-Independence era (e.g., British groups
such as Martin Burn, Andrew Yule, Inchcape) did not persist in the form
they then had. Several new business houses rose to prominence during this
period, including the Thapar group in the 1950s and 1960s, the Ambani
group in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Wipro and Munjal groups in the
1980s and 1990s. Thus, the history of the modern Indian corporate sector
is characterized by both a persistence of concentrated ownership at the ag-
gregate level and a signiﬁcant lack of persistence of dominance at the indi-
vidual business group level.
Todemonstrate this point more formally, we analyzed the persistence of
dominance for Indian business groups over the past sixty years. This is
based on size rankings (assets) for the ﬁfty largest business groups com-
piled by Dr. Gita Piramal of Mumbai, India, for the years 1939, 1969, and
1999 (table 5.4). Her rankings have themselves been compiled from mis-
cellaneous historical sources, including, but not limited to, various gov-
ernment reports commissioned by the government of India at various
points in time. Note that the rankings are not of ﬁrms but of groups. That
is, all ﬁrms controlled by a single entity, typically a family, are treated as a
single economic unit. As a benchmark against which to compare our anal-
ysis of the persistence of Indian groups, we also amass market value–based
rankings of the ﬁfty largest U.S. ﬁrms at identical time periods. These data
are compiled from Compustat and are provided in table 5.5.
Consult table 5.6 for some summary statistics. Our ﬁrst observation is
that the Indian data show considerable turnover in ranks. Thirty-two out
of ﬁfty of the top groups in 1969 were not in the top-ﬁfty list in 1939. Forty-
three of the top groups in 1999 were not in the top-ﬁfty list in 1969. This
ﬂux in the list of largest entities is greater than that in the United States in
comparable time periods, where twenty-eight and thirty-seven ﬁrms enter
the top-ﬁfty U.S. list in 1969 and 1999, respectively. The comparison is all
the more dramatic because the Indian data measure groups, which are col-
lections of ﬁrms, while the U.S. data measure ﬁrms. (In other words, indi-
vidual ﬁrms within Indian groups almost certainly would have greater
turnover than that suggested by the data on groups.)
Of the eighteen groups that remain in the top-ﬁfty list in the 1939–69
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1939 1969 1997
Ranking Group Assets Group Assets Group Assets
1 Tata 62.42 Tata 505.36 Tata 37,510.80
2 Martin Burn 18.02 Birla 456.40 B.K.-K.M. Birla 19,497.94
3 Bird 12.40 Martin Burn 153.06 Reliance 19,345.59
4 Andrew Yule 12.38 Bangur 104.31 RPG 9,664.12
5 Inchcape 10.70 Thapar 98.80 Essar 9,593.78
6 E.D. Sassoon 9.56 S. Nagarmull 95.61 O.P. Jindal 5,456.10
7 ACC 8.68 Mafatlal 92.70 MAC 4,782.10
8 Begg 5.75 ACC 89.80 L.M. Thapar 4,434.09
9 Oriental Tel. & Elec. 5.60 Walchand 81.11 Ispat 4,425.35
10 Dalmia 5.51 Shriram 74.13 Group USHA 4,210.87
11 Jardine 5.33 Bird Heilgers 68.62 Lalbhai 4,112.44
12 Wallace Bros. 5.33 J.K. Singhania 66.84 Videocon 3,737.87
13 Birla 4.85 Goenka 65.34 Lloyd Steel 3,705.27
14 Wadia 4.70 Sahu Jain 58.75 Bajaj Group 3,415.87
15 Duncan 4.54 Macneill & Barry 57.28 Williamson Magor 3,351.62
16 Finlay 3.84 Sarabhai 56.72 Hari S. Singhania 3,275.80
17 Scindia 3.66 Scindia 55.99 K.K. Birla 3,094.90
18 Killick 3.51 Lalbhai 51.20 Torrent 3,077.23
19 Kilburn 3.23 Killick 51.08 Hinduja 2,967.20
20 Sarabhai 3.00 ICI 50.06 Arvind Mafatlal 2,862.94
21 Brady 2.82 Andrew Yule 46.75 Murugappa Chettiar 2,840.62
22 Rajputana Textiles 2.80 TVS 43.83 Escorts 2,642.22
23 Steel Bros. 2.77 Kirloskar 43.02 Mahindra 2,633.70
24 MacLeod 2.67 Parry 41.93 G.P. Goenka 2,630.43
25 Walchand 2.61 Jardine Hend. 40.19 C.K. Birla 2,530.32
26 Lawrie 2.55 Mahindra 38.58 Kirloskar 2,622.61
27 Thackersey 2.56 Bajaj 35.28 Nagarjuna 2,511.54
28 Mafatlal 2.45 Simpson 32.92 Jaiprakash Group 2,442.48
29 BIC 2.38 Seshasayee 32.72 Indo Rama 2,440.88
30 Lalbhai 2.33 Gill Arbuthnot 29.02 U.B. Group 2,414.65
31 Kettlewell 2.23 Kilachand 27.22 Kalyani 2,395.29
32 Gillanders 2.16 Dalmia J. 26.72 G.E. Shipping 2,357.59
33 Shri Ram 2.16 Naidu G.V. 26.41 Oswal Agro 2,342.36
34 Swedish Match 2.05 Shapoor Pallonji 26.36 Wadia 2,334.97
35 Octavious Steel 2.00 Turner Morrison 23.15 Manu Chhabria 2,286.02
36 Shaw 1.95 Ruiaa 22.40 T.S. Santhanam 2,214.06
37 C.V. Mehta 1.90 Naidu V.R. 21.55 S.K. Birla 2,080.11
38 Mangaldas 1.80 A&F Harvey 21.33 Vijaypat Singhania 1,979.88
39 Daga 1.67 Wadia 20.56 Modern 1,967.85
40 Forbes 1.59 Shaw Wallace 20.14 M.M. Thapar 1,963.47
41 Harvey 1.50 Murugappa 20.07 Ranbaxy 1,875.71
42 Dunlop 1.42 Modi 19.38 SRF/A. Bharat Ram 1,863.26
43 Spencer 1.38 RamaKrishna 18.79 Finolex 1,712.73
44 Williamson 1.23 Chinai 18.36 Godrej 1,695.97
45 Harrisons 0.89 Jaipuria 18.24 BPL 1,691.57
46 Henderson 0.63 Kamani 18.05 Vinod Doshi 1,519.89
47 C. Jehangir 0.42 Rallis 17.94 Usha Martin 1,514.06period (ﬁfty less thirty-two), sixteen change ranks, while only two have
ranks that remain unchanged. Further, ten of the eighteen groups whose
ranks change do so dramatically (that is, by more than ten ranks in either
direction). In contrast, a smaller proportion of the ﬁrms whose ranks
change in the U.S. top-ﬁfty list in 1939–69 do so dramatically (ﬁve out of
twenty-two). The proportion of radical rank changers is also higher in In-
dia during the 1969–99 period (three out of seven) than in the United States
in the same period (ﬁve out of thirteen).
Note also that the turnover in the ranks of Indian groups is greater in the
second thirty-year window than in the ﬁrst. This is important because part
of the turnover in the 1939–69 period was due to transfer of assets from
British ownership to Indian ownership at the end of the British colonial
rule of India. The turnover in the 1969–99 period reﬂects less unusual cir-
cumstances.
Finally, an analysis of the groups or ﬁrms that are born in any period
suggests that they do not generally leapfrog to the top of the rankings, nor
do the top groups or ﬁrms in any period dramatically fall oﬀ the rankings.
A regression of ranks on “births” and on a variable that measures whether
the group or ﬁrm is going to “die” (that is, exit the top rankings) the fol-
lowing period reveals positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on both vari-
ables. That is, ﬁrms born in a particular period have higher ranks (are
smaller), and ﬁrms that are about to die in the next period have higher
ranks (are smaller). The regression reveals point estimates that are quite
similar for both the Indian top-ﬁfty group and U.S. top-ﬁfty ﬁrm rankings,
hinting at some underlying similarity in the competitive processes under-
lying such turnover.
This pattern of corporate ownership in India is inconsistent with a pure
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Table 5.4 (continued)
1939 1969 1997
Ranking Group Assets Group Assets Group Assets
48 Turner 0.39 Thackersey 17.19 OWM 1,412.76
49 Provident 0.34 Thiagaraja 16.55 Amalgamation 1,353.47
50 J. Warren 0.22 Swedish Match 15.70 Vardhman 1,282.40
Sources: 1939 data compiled from Markovits (1985), pp. 192–93. Signiﬁcant exclusions (for miscella-
neous reasons) from the list are BAT, Thomas Duﬀ, J. Taylor, Assam Company, Burmah Oil, E. Peek,
and Hukumchand. As we are concerned only with Indian groups and as rankings are not relevant for the
purpose of this article, we can safely assume that all the key Indian business houses have been accounted
for in the preindependence period in the table. 1969 data compiled from Report of the Industrial Li-
censing Policy Inquiry Committee, 1969. 1997 data compiled from Business Today.
Notes: Assets in RsCr. Normally sales or market cap are the accepted international criteria for ranking
business performance. However, assets have been taken in this case for the sake of uniformity. Accurate,
reliable, and complete data for Indian business houses by sales are not available pre-1984.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.corporate ownership entrenchment story. We will turn, in each of the next
two sections, to considering two potential explanations for concentrated
ownership in an emerging economy like India (Ghemawat and Khanna
1998; Khanna 2000). The ﬁrst explanation has to do with rent-seeking be-
havior by prominent business families with strong political connections.
Under this hypothesis, business families control business groups to extract
personal gains, and they attain their position through directly unproduc-
tive economic activities and through their inﬂuence over government poli-
ciesand actions. The second hypothesis is that family business groups arise
as a result of their entrepreneurial activity, which is in short supply in
emerging economies such as India with signiﬁcant market failures and in-
stitutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 1999, 2000b,c).
5.3 Political Connections and Rent-Seeking Behavior
In this section, we ﬁrst describe how business-government relationships
evolved over the relevant time frame for this paper, and then we consider
particular groups’ relationships with the government, with a view to un-
covering whether or not there is systematic evidence to support the politi-
cal connections story for persistence of concentrated ownership.
5.3.1 Shifting Contours of Business-Government Relations
A close relationship between business and government had existed for
quite some time in India. During the British colonial rule, the interest of
British companies was naturally favored over the interest of Indian busi-
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Table 5.6 Persistence of dominance of Indian groups and U.S. ﬁrms over sixty years
Indian groups U.S. ﬁrms
1939–69 1969–99 1939–69 1969–99
Birth 32 43 28 37
RankUp 6375




Notes:Birth refers to the number of groups or ﬁrms that are “born” in the thirty-year window
in question—that is, that enter the top 50 list for that country in that time window, given that
they were not part of the list in the previous thirty-year window (there are no groups or ﬁrms
that exit and then re-enter the top 50 list in either country). RankUp refers to the number of
groups or ﬁrms that rise in the asset-based size rankings. A smaller rank measures a larger
group or ﬁrm, with rank  1 and rank  50 being the largest and the smallest of the top-50
groups or ﬁrms in each country in each time period. RankUp10 counts the groups or ﬁrms
whose rank rises by more than 10. RankDown and RankDown10 are deﬁned analogously.
RankSame counts the number of groups or ﬁrms whose rank remains unchanged during that
thirty-year period.ness houses (Piramal 1998, pp. 162, 230). As the movement for freedom
from the British Raj gathered momentum in the 1920s and 1930s, close re-
lationships developed between Indian businesses and leaders of the politi-
cal movement for India’s independence. Underscoring their symbiotic re-
lationship in a letter, as he was building steam for India’s independence
movement in 1927, Mohandas Gandhi told G. D. Birla, a prominent In-
dian businessman, “I am ever hungry for money” (cited in Piramal 1991).
The pragmatic collaboration between the new Indian government and
the business community to build modern India continued in the immediate
aftermath of independence (1947 to 1960). For example, Hindalco and
Telco collaborated with the government of India to set up Hindustan Aero-
nautics Limited to develop the aviation sector in India. However, the rela-
tionship soured in the 1960s as Indian government, under the leadership of
Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru, moved the country’s economic policies
toward socialism. This period, often characterized as the License Raj, be-
gan with the government’s desire to curb big business houses and to di-
rectly intervene in economic activities through public-sector corporations.
Several prominent government commissions, including the Maha-
lanobis Committee of 1964, the Monopolies Inquiry Commission of 1965,
the R. K. Hazari Committee of 1966, and the Industrial Licensing Policy
Committee of 1969, were established during this period. These commis-
sions documented evidence that big business houses were exerting signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on Indian economy and that they were exploiting growth
opportunities through favorable access to ﬁnance and government per-
mits. These commissions were followed by the creation of the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) and the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA), and the nationalization of the largest private-
sector banks. These policy changes, spearheaded by the government of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, imposed strict government controls on the
private sector’s ability to pursue growth opportunities, access domestic
ﬁnance, or collaborate with foreign technology or business partners. The
FERA also required that multinational companies operating in India di-
vest their ownership so that a majority of the ownership in the Indian op-
erations was held by Indian shareholders.
In the mid-1980s, under the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gan-
dhi, a gradual move toward deregulation began. These reforms relaxed
some of the MRTP and import restrictions and freed up some of the econ-
omy from licensing requirements. Despite these changes, the Indian econ-
omy grew at a fairly modest rate during this entire period, culminating 
in a foreign exchange payment crisis in the early 1990s. This crisis led to a
dramatic deregulation and liberalization of the Indian economy. Under
the Congress Party government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, and
then subsequently under the Bhartiya Janata Party government of Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, the MRTP and FERA Acts were repealed,
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cial aviation, and banking—previously reserved for the public sector—
were opened to the private sector, and import duties were dramatically
reduced.
5.3.2 Business Groups and Government
As the contours of business-government relations shifted in India dur-
ing the past half century, there were complex shifts in relationships be-
tween individual business groups and the government in power. Diﬀerent
groups occupied diﬀerent positions of favoritism at diﬀerent times. There
is evidence that these political connections played an important role in the
rise and fall of diﬀerent business houses. But it is interesting that the groups
that remained dominant throughout did so despite ebbs and ﬂows in their
relationship with the government. Clearly proximity to government was
not the only cause of their success.
Consider the House of Tata. J. R. D. Tata, in the preindependence pe-
riod, presided over a group that was, in fact, quite reliant on government
contracts. Before World War I, Tata Steel would not have started without
a guarantee from the British government for Indian Railways, nor would
Tata Steel have grown into the largest integrated steel factory in the British
Commonwealth without such government contracts. And Tata Steel was
protected by tariﬀs against German and Japanese, if not British, steel
(Hazari 1986). The Tatas adopted a neutral stance in the Independence
movement. As Piramal (1998, p. 481) puts it, in the British Raj, the Tata
Group “bristled” with knights.
But by 1960, the group remained India’s largest even though it had fallen
out of favor, as it was opposed to the socialist philosophy of Prime Minis-
ter Nehru. Reacting to the various government commissions suggesting
that large business houses manipulated and abused the licensing system,
J. R. D. Tata is reported to have cynically said, “Yesterday in Parliament,
they called me a monopolist with ‘great concentration of power.’ I wake up
every morning and I am supposed to say, ‘I have great concentration of
power. Whom shall I crush today? A competitor or a worker in my factory
or the consumer?’ . . . No dear boy I am powerless....  I  c annot decide how
much to borrow, what shares to issue, at what price, what wages or bonus
to pay, and what dividend to give. I even need the government’s permission
for the salary I pay to a senior executive” (quoted in Das 2000, pp. 168–69).
Indeed, far from manipulating the licensing system to its advantage, the
Tata group reportedly made 119 new proposals for expansions in (existing
or de novo) businesses between 1960 and 1989, and every one of them was
rejected (Das, p. 93). Further, some of the Tatas’ assets were nationalized,
most famously Tata’s airline. And J. R. D. Tata contributed to the Swatan-
tara Party’s coﬀers to create an alternative to Nehru’s Congress since the
former stood for less regulation than that espoused by the latter.
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the Independence movement ﬁnancially. Sarojini Naidu, herself a promi-
nent ﬁgure in the India of that era, famously said, “it took all Birla’s mil-
lions to enable Gandhi to live in poverty. And he gave for free” (Piramal
1998). The group rose to prominence in the postindependence period and
by1969 became the second-largest Indian business group. However, under
the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Birla group became
the target of criticism for its manipulation of the licensing system, as it was
targeted by the Hazari reports and criticized for preempting licenses—that
is, for applying for licenses that it then failed to use. Indeed G. D. Birla’s
successor, Aditya Birla, was allegedly suﬃciently disappointed by being, in
his view, unfairly tarnished by the government’s allegations, that he simply
shifted his expansion plans overseas. So much so that, between 1970 and
1995, the Birlas had established plants in Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, with overseas activity accounting for a third of
their overall business, and the world’s leading position in viscose staple
ﬁber, palm oil, and insulators, and the world’s sixth-largest position in the
manufacture of carbon black (Das 2000, p. 176). The implication is that
the size and prominence of the group is due to the Birlas’ entrepreneurial
tendencies’ ﬁnding expression around the licensing restrictions at least in
part, rather than by embracing them and engaging purely in rent-seeking
activities.
All this is not to deny that rent seeking existed. Clearly there were abuses
in the system; far too many indicators are consistent with this. See recently
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), for example, and our own ear-
lier work (Khanna 2000; Khanna and Palepu 2000a) on the dark side of
business groups.4 But it is a mistake to tar the entire corporate sector with
the same broad brush. As the caselets above suggest, some of the groups re-
mained dominant despite sustained periods of falling out of favor. Others
directed their energies to expansion outside India rather than manipulat-
ing the licensing system.
Further, note the following possibility of possibly misplaced emphasis
and incorrect inference. We do not contest that the License Raj was bad for
economic development. As Hazari (1986, p. xxiv) put it, “the abuses and
failures are no longer, as the Italians say, mere apertura;they are wide-open
doors.” But whether concentrated ownership was the cause of this miasma
is less clear. The “Kafkaesque maze of controls” (Bhagwati 1993) had more
to do with a heady fascination with the intellectual cuisine of the London
School of Economics and Cambridge (Hazari 1986), and the wonder of the
then-ascendant Soviet planning machine, than with the actions of India’s
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4. De Long (2001) suggests, based on an analysis of growth rates of several countries, that
the eﬀects of the License Raj might have been overstated (or, at least, the negative eﬀects were
oﬀset by other positive factors).dominant family businesses. Business groups had to either manipulate it,
as some did, or invent themselves around it, as did others.
5.4 Entrepreneurship in the Context of Institutional Voids
In an emerging economy, many institutions necessary for the function-
ing of product markets, labor markets, and ﬁnancial markets are typically
missing or underdeveloped. In India, this was certainly true under colonial
rule. Indeed, the heavy state intervention in the economy in the ﬁrst few
decades of independence was justiﬁed by successive governments as a way
to deal with these market failures.
As Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999, 2000b,c) and others (Leﬀ 1976,
1978; Strachan 1976) argue, business groups could be seen as a private-
sector response to the institutional voids in the economy. Groups often
perform functions traditionally performed by market institutions in more
mature markets. One such important function is the provision of some-
thing akin to venture capital, consisting of identifying promising new busi-
ness opportunities in the economy and exploiting them with in-house risk
capital and managerial talent, which are traditionally in short supply in the
economy at large. This, in turn, leads to the observed predominance of the
business group type of organizational form in emerging economies.
It is important to note that this hypothesis only implies that economies
such as India will have a preponderance of business group–type organiza-
tions. It does not necessarily imply that the same set of business groups will
continue to be prominent in the economy over time. This continued success
of a business group under this explanation depends on its ability to sustain
its entrepreneurial nature over a long period of time. While some groups
may succeed in this endeavor, others may fail. In this sense, the rise and fall
of business groups over time in emerging economies is akin to the rise and
fall of businesses in advanced economies.
The history of the Tata group provides a classic example of how some In-
dian business groups pursued new business opportunities successfully over
time. Figure 5.1 shows the time line of the entry of the Tata group into var-
ious new businesses, from 1870 to 2001—textiles in 1874, the hospitality in-
dustry in 1902, steel in 1907, power in 1910, cement in 1912, soaps and toi-
letries in 1917, printing and publishing in 1931, aviation in 1932, chemicals
in 1939, consumer electronics in 1940, commercial vehicles and locomo-
tives in 1945, cosmetics in 1952, air-conditioning in 1954, pharmaceuticals
in 1958, tea and coﬀeein 1962, information technology in 1968 (see section
5.6), watches and ﬁnancial services in 1984, auto components in 1993, tele-
com services in 1994, passenger cars in 1998, retail in 1999, and insurance
in 2001. Despite the remarkable diversity of these businesses, the group has
been able to maintain a leading position in many, if not most, of the busi-
nesses it entered over time. It had to exit only a small handful of businesses





























































































.in its history—aviation in 1953 (due to government nationalization), loco-
motives in 1970, soaps and toiletries in 1993, cosmetics and pharmaceuti-
cals in 1998, cement in 2000, textiles in 2001, and printing and publishing
in 2003.5
The role played by the Tatas is exactly to ﬁll the institutional void of ven-
ture capital in these instances as well as to provide an exit mechanism to as-
piring entrepreneurs in the absence of well-functioning public markets. For
example, Tata Chemicals supported its engineers’ eﬀorts to innovate. In
some instances, these engineers left to start up their own companies, and
the Tatas had been known to buy out the results of these eﬀorts subse-
quently (see example in Piramal 1998, p. 473).
It is interesting that this process of entrepreneurship is often criticized in
the media as being undisciplined and characterized by a failure to adhere to
core competencies. This reﬂects a mistaken notion of what constitutes the
“core competence,” as it were. Here it is at least as much an ability to cir-
cumvent institutional voids as it is some industry-speciﬁc knowledge. As
N. A. Soonawala, a board member of Tata Sons, the main holding company
of the Tatas, said to us in 1998 in response to criticisms by leading multi-
national consulting ﬁrms at the time, “If everyone is told not to go into un-
related businesses, how will the airlines, oil, and telecommunications in-
dustries develop? The government has said that they can’t do it. So there’s a
social beneﬁt to all this diversiﬁcation” (Khanna, Palepu, and Wu 1998).
An important feature of entrepreneurship in India is the reliance on the
ethnic group to supplement family networks (Lamb 1976). The Marwari,
Gujerati, and Parsi communities are, by far, the dominant business com-
munities in India in recent decades, and even today. For example, these
communities collectively controlled 62 of the 100 largest companies in
1989 (Piramal 1989). Other active communities include the Punjabis, Chet-
tiars, and Maharashtrians.
These communities share their distinctive tenors. For example, Gujeratis
weretraditionally traders with countries in the Middle East and East Africa.
Parsis, from the small minority Zoroastrian community in India, were most
“Westernized” in their business outlook, and traditionally played the role of
intermediaries with Europe. Marwaris, a demographically small segment
originally from the state of Rajasthan in western India, have been the most
geographically spread business community, pursuing businesses all over the
country. By 2000, Das (2000, p. 174) quotes an estimate that says that the
Marwaris controlled half the industrial assets of India.
Timberg (1978) chronicled the modus operandi of Marwari businesses.
Traditionally, the great Marwari ﬁrms had networks spreading all over
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5. There appears to have been a short-lived and aborted entry into shipping in the late
1890s. This eﬀort, along with those of a number of other Indian entrepreneurs until the es-
tablishment of Walhand Hirachand’s Scindia shipping company, foundered when faced with
the British-controlled shipping “conference” controlled by Inchcape and others.Asia and deep into China. They relied on their own kin for information and
for eﬀective contractual enforcement. In our terminology, these ethnic net-
works were substitutes for institutional voids, and shared features with the
networks used by the Genoese and Maghribi traders studied by Greif
(1994) and by the Rothschilds. Famously, the Marwaris’ simple and rigor-
ous, if manual, cost-accounting systems provided a cost-eﬀective means of
ﬁnancing that allowed them to stomach risks in a time of capital scarcity.
In pre-British and British India, the history of prominent business
groups is characterized by the willingness of the successful members of
each ethnic community to help spawn new members, sometimes even to
compete with their existing businesses. For example, several prominent
Marwari groups in existence today are spun oﬀ from the Birla group. Bir-
las have been known to actively encourage talented employees to pursue
their own business opportunities, and sometimes even ﬁnance these new
ventures. Several groups spun oﬀ the Birla group (e.g., Khaitan and Kejri-
wal, to cite just a couple) and continue to exist today (Piramal 1998,
pp. 142–43). Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a prominent textile businessman, helped
his ethnic group members with the technology of setting up textile mills.
Walchand Hirachand Doshi actively promoted shipping companies, in-
cluding direct competitors of his own, as part of the struggle against the
British Raj (Piramal, pp. 162, 230). As Lamb (1976) puts it, the acts of en-
trepreneurship in British India were heroic, especially in view of the pow-
erful interests arrayed against the entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurship has continued in modern times and extends be-
yond expansion of product lines to institutional innovation. A good ex-
ample is that of the Ambanis. A relatively recent entrant into the leading
business groups, the ﬂagship company, Reliance, is India’s only entry into
the Global Fortune 500. While many point to a close relationship with the
government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as being part of the reason for the com-
pany’s initial success—founder Dhirubhai Ambani famously said he
would “salaam” (salute) anyone to sell his ideas6—the fact remains that the
group has developed world-class capabilities in managing large-scale cap-
ital intensive projects and is an innovative ﬁnancier. Its most notable con-
tribution to institutional innovation in India is perhaps the creation of an
equity cult. As Das (2000, chap. 13) chronicles, Dhirubhai Ambani single-
handedly mobilized small investors around the country in 1977 and listed
on the Bombay and Ahmedabad stock exchanges when the dominant
public ﬁnancial institutions would not lend him capital. Between 1980 and
1985, the number of Indian shareholders went from one to four million,
and fully 25 percent of these shareholders owned shares in Reliance, the
Ambani company.
To recapitulate, we have considered two classes of explanations—rent-
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6. The quotation is from India Today, 30 June 1985 (cited in Piramal 1991).seeking behavior and entrepreneurial activity—to explain the dual phe-
nomena of persistence of concentrated ownership but turnover in the iden-
tity of the concentrated owners. Both explanations have circumstantial ev-
idence in favor of them. Superﬁcial attempts to attribute data to one or the
other of these explanations should be met with disdain. It is hard to believe,
in particular, that rent seeking can provide a full explanation, especially of
the shifting identity of concentrated ownership.
5.5 The Recent Evolution of Groups and Markets
The evidence presented to this point is consistent with the idea that In-
dian business groups with family and community ties arose historically, in
part, due to the absence of well-developed ﬁnancial markets. During the
past three decades, ﬁnancial markets in India have developed signiﬁcantly,
in part due to paradoxical consequences of policies aimed at other ends
during the era of socialism, and in part due to direct attempts by the gov-
ernment aimed at market development during the more recent reform era.
Under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act passed during the socialist
era of the 1960s and 1970s, multinationals operating in India were required
to reduce their ownership to below 40 percent and divest the rest to Indian
investors. To comply with this requirement, many multinationals oﬀered
their shares to public investors through public oﬀerings on the BSE. The is-
sue prices were set by the Controller of Capital Issues, a government body,
at book values that were often dramatically below economic values. As a
result, individual investors were able to buy shares at very attractive prices
in very good companies. These public oﬀerings had a number of spillover
eﬀects. First, they created a culture of equity ownership in India on a large
scale, because many retail investors were attracted to the opportunity of
earning signiﬁcant returns that were almost assured. Second, the process
of listing these companies on the BSE resulted in the creation of an inter-
mediation and market infrastructure—accounting and auditing profes-
sionals, ﬁnancial analysts, investment bankers, and stockbrokers.
When India began to liberalize its economy in the 1990s, one of the key
objectives of the government policy was to attract foreign institutional in-
vestors. To accomplish this, the government established the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), modeled closely after the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission. Following the establishment of SEBI, a number of
signiﬁcant capital market reforms were put in place: new regulations
strengthening corporate disclosure and governance standards, new regula-
tions and enforcement mechanisms to ensure orderly and fair trading prac-
tices on the country’s stock exchanges, and the opening of the market to
international ﬁnancial intermediaries. Companies were allowed to ﬂoat
shares at market prices, rather than at the artiﬁcially low prices dictated by
the Controller of Capital Issues. Finally, Indian companies were also al-
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changes resulted in signiﬁcantly improved ﬁnancial markets in India and
enhanced the ability of entrepreneurs and established businesses to access
domestic and international equity capital.
These changes, coupled with a signiﬁcant deregulation of product mar-
kets, led to new opportunities and challenges for business groups. A num-
ber of ﬁrst-generation entrepreneurs were able to tap into the capital mar-
kets to exploit new business opportunities. Prominent among them was the
Reliance group, which raised vast sums of money on the BSE to ﬁnance its
petrochemical ventures to become one of the largest enterprises in India.
Reliance went on to become a diversiﬁed business group when it began to
exploit new business opportunities thrown open with the deregulation of
power and telecommunication sectors. This era also gave rise to a number
of prominent companies in the software and pharmaceutical sectors—
Infosys, Wipro, and Satyam Computer Services in software, and Ranbaxy
and Dr. Reddy’s in pharmaceuticals. Some of these companies are family
controlled but professionally managed (Wipro, Satyam, Ranbaxy, and Dr.
Reddy’s); some are diversiﬁed (Wipro operating in consumer products and
information technology); while others are focused in one sector (Infosys,
Satyam, Ranbaxy, and Dr. Reddy’s).
While the development of capital markets and the deregulation and
globalization of the Indian economy have given rise to the birth of these
new entrepreneurial ﬁrms, some of the old family business groups have
also adapted and grown during this era. The most prominent among them
is the Tata group, which continues to be the largest business group in India.
The Tata group has been able to exploit many of the new business oppor-
tunities in software and telecom. Today, Tata Consultancy Services, one of
the Tata group companies, is the country’s largest information technology
services company, and Tata Telecom is one of the largest telecommunica-
tion companies in India.
5.6 The Indian Software Industry
5.6.1 Why study the software industry?
The software services industry provides a lower bound on the relative
advantage of family business groups over independent entrepreneurs in ex-
ploiting new opportunities for a number of reasons. First, the industry was
very conducive to de novo entry because of low capital requirements, little
government regulation on entry, and a relatively low level of minimum eco-
nomic scale to achieve proﬁtability. Further, the Indian government in-
vested in elite technical institutions, such as the Indian Institutes of Tech-
nology and Indian Institutes of Management, and a large number of other
engineering colleges. These institutions produced abundant talent, a criti-
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relying on a recognized education brand, were more willing to work for de
novo startups than for incumbent business groups. Finally, government
policies restricting operations of multinationals such as IBM left plenty of
opportunities for domestic entrepreneurs. Given all these factors, software
services is one industry where individual entrepreneurs could compete
eﬀectively with the established family business houses of India. Further,
business houses could not rely on any ability they might have had to exer-
cise regulatory muscle, since there were no regulations to muscle into.
Thus, the history of software industry, and the role of business groups in
this industry, provide further evidence on why business groups play such an
important role in India even today.
5.6.2 Origins of the Indian Software Industry
Until the mid-1960s, there was virtually no software development going
on in India. Whatever software sold was bundled with computers sold by
multinational companies like IBM. The early software development eﬀorts
focused on producing in-house applications for eﬃcient use of these com-
puters. Government policies attempted to encourage the growth of a do-
mestic hardware industry through high import tariﬀs on hardware. State-
owned hardware companies, such as the Electronic Corporation of India
Limited, attempted to produce computers for domestic (academic and
commercial) use, and these eﬀorts included development of operating sys-
tems, compilers, and application packages. Most of these eﬀorts, however,
were not very successful.
Of course, many of the reasons to which modern observers attribute the
success of today’s Indian software industry—for example, low-cost talent,
English language, and a tradition of entrepreneurship—did in fact exist
prior to the 1960s. The fact that the industry did not, however, and the fact
that the industry continues not to have made a mark in other low-cost,
English-speaking countries suggests that these are certainly not suﬃcient
conditions for the success of the Indian software industry.
It is instructive that the industry really got its start with the establish-
ment in 1968 of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Tata Sons, itself the holding company of the Tata Group, a di-
versiﬁed business group and the epitome of concentrated ownership.
According to Heeks (1996), TCS was the ﬁrst commercial organization to
subscribe to the export commitment–related terms under which the Indian
government allowed the import of hardware. Tata’s ostensible purpose was
to allow its diverse companies to use computers in their operations. Toward
this end, the company formed an alliance with Burroughs Corporation.
Under this alliance, Burroughs would help secure U.S. clients for TCS; in
return, TCS would act as an exclusive sales agent for Burroughs hardware
in India. Based on this alliance, TCS secured its ﬁrst U.S. client—the De-
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pany in India, employing more than 19,000 software engineers. The com-
pany is privately held, fully owned by Tata Sons Limited, the apex of the
Tata group companies.
But it was a serendipitous event that triggered the rise of TCS, having to
do with the withdrawal of the incumbent, IBM, in 1978. IBM took this step
in response to the FERA, which limited MNCs to a maximum of 40 per-
cent ownership stake in their Indian subsidiaries and speciﬁed policies for
access to foreign exchange for imports and for the use of foreign exchange
earned through exports. Multinational companies had to choose between
reducing their stake to this level by selling their shares to the Indian public
and leaving the country. Several MNCs chose to dilute their stakes through
public oﬀerings on the BSE, but IBM and Coca-Cola were two prominent
exceptions. The decision of IBM to leave India meant that 1,200 employ-
ees of the company had to look for other alternatives to exploit their skills.
Many of these employees set up small software consulting companies that
would oﬀer software development and maintenance services to former
IBM customers, leading to the beginnings of the Indian software industry.
The departure of IBM also allowed many smaller hardware companies to
expand into India, exposing Indian software programmers to a variety of
software platforms.
Other unintended consequences of Indian government policy also
played a role in shaping the nascent industry. For example, the severe im-
port restrictions on hardware—requirements of government permits, high
customs duties, and control of foreign currency availability—gave a ﬁllip
to the industry practice that received the derogatory title of “bodyshop-
ping,” whereby programmers were shipped oﬀto the client site and worked
on the client’s computers. This in turn led to some companies’ building re-
lationships with their clients that were then to play a major role in shaping
the industry.
The outward-looking nature of the industry from the outset was also in-
ﬂuenced by the unattractiveness of the domestic market. This, in turn, had
several causes. First, fearing unemployment from automation, the govern-
ment did not encourage the adoption of computerization in government
and state-owned enterprises. Second, its interest in developing a domestic
hardware industry led the government to impose extremely high tariﬀs
(350 percent in much of the 1970s and early 1980s). Third, Indian private-
sector companies had little incentive to adopt information technology to
improve operations and productivity, given the highly protected nature of
the economy. As a result, Indian software ﬁrms found it diﬃcult to gener-
ate much demand for their services in the domestic market. This outward
orientation stood in signiﬁcant contrast to the orientation of much of the
Indian private sector, which was focused on the Indian domestic market
rather than the export market.
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under the discerning bureaucrat’s otherwise omnipresent proverbial radar
screen, so to speak. The origin of India’s socialist policies and heavy-
handed micromanagement of enterprise lay in Oxford- and Cambridge-
indoctrinated Fabian socialism, which sought to regulate the “command-
ing heights” of the economy. But this required physical assets to control.
Software, with its characteristic intangibles, was too ephemeral to be in-
cluded in the purview of these regulations.
Other than the intangible nature of the assets in question in the software
industry, another reason why the industry escaped some of the pernicious
eﬀects of Indian socialism had to do with its non-capital-intensive nature.
The state’s stranglehold on the ﬁnancial sector did not matter as much.
Several of the last decade’s changes have helped move an already existing
industry along. For example, far-ranging deregulation initiated following
an exchange rate crisis in 1990 generically improved the outlook for busi-
ness. The delicensing of hardware imports and the greatly falling hardware
prices internationally meant that entry barriers into the Indian domestic
software industry fell drastically. Software ﬁrms were allowed to set up
private telecommunications networks to promote remote software services
(often to clients in the west). The party in power until early 2004, the Bhar-
tiya Janata Party (BJP), was generally pro-business and the ﬁrst to explic-
itly support the software industry in its election manifesto.
But our general point is that these recent changes do not shed much light
on the origins of the industry. It is interesting to ask how a low-cost, talent-
intensive environment could become a world player in a knowledge-
intensive industry. Clearly serendipity, as opposed to explicit design,
played a role. More interesting for our purposes, concentrated ownership,
in the garb of TCS, was the best positioned to capitalize on the opportuni-
ties revealed by serendipity. Indeed, the ownership links among the Tata
companies were among the ties that cemented them (along with director
interlocks, a shared if informal access to the Tata brand, and shared sen-
ior-level talent) and permitted TCS to leverage the Tata group’s reputation.
It is doubtful that an entity could have arisen in a vacuum, unaﬃliated with
an existing reputable private-sector entity, to capitalize on the software in-
dustry opportunity. In a subsequent subsection, we will show how TCS’s
approach diﬀered from that of other ﬁrms in India and that not only did
TCS not deter the entry of de novo aspirants, but it actually facilitated
entry.
5.6.3 The Modern Industrial Organization 
of the Indian Software Industry
Table 5.7shows the distribution of the companies in the industry by rev-
enues. Table 5.8 shows a list of top-twenty companies and their revenues.
The top ﬁve ﬁrms in the industry, with sales greater than 10 billion Indian
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ﬁve ﬁrms are TCS, Infosys Technologies, Wipro Technologies, Satyam
Computer Services, and HCL Technologies. Wipro, TCS, and Satyam are
aﬃliated with family-owned business groups, which entered the software
industry as part of a diversiﬁcation move by their parent groups. Within
these three, TCS is privately owned; Wipro is publicly traded, but approx-
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Table 5.7 Structure of Indian software exports industry
No. of companies
Annual turnover 2000–2001 2001–2002
Above Rs. 1,000 crore 5 5
Rs. 500–1,000 crore 7 5
Rs. 250–500 crore 14 15
Rs. 100–250 crore 28 27
Rs. 50–100 crore 25 55
Rs. 10–50 crore 193 220
Below Rs. 10 crore 544 2,483
Source: Adapted from NASSCOM (2003).
Note: In 2001–2, companies with under Rs. 10 crore in revenues included non-NASSCOM
member companies.
Table 5.8 Top 20 IT software and services exporters from India
Ranking Company Rs. crore US$ million
1 Tata Consultancy Services 3,882 813
2 Infosys Technologies Ltd. 2,553 535
3 Wipro Technologies 2,256 481
4 Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 1,703 357
5 HCL Technologies Ltd. 1,319 277
6 IBM Global Services India Pvt. Ltd. 764 160
7 Patni Computer Services 732 153
8 Silverline Technologies 603 126
9 Mahindra-British Telecom Ltd. 541 113
10 Pentasoft Technologies Ltd. 459 96
11 HCL Perot Systems Ltd. 449 94
12 Pentamedia Graphics Ltd. 431 90
13 NIIT Ltd. 400 84
14 Mascot Systems Ltd. 399 84
15 i-Flex Solutions Ltd. 392 82
16 Digital Globalsoft Ltd. 331 69
17 Mphasis BFL Group (consolidated) 313 66
18 Mascon Global Ltd. 307 64
19 Orbitech 264 55
20 Mastek Ltd. 259 54
Source: Adapted from NASSCOM (2003).imately 84 percent of the shares are held by the founder; Satyam is publicly
traded, with only 11 percent of the shares held by the founding family.
Infosys and HCL were started by computer professionals and are publicly
listed companies. There are also several large Indian software companies
that are aﬃliates of multinational companies. These include Indian arms
of overseas software services ﬁrms such as IBM Global Services. Also,
there are arms of multinational operating companies that use India as a
base for their internal software development needs. Examples include
Siemens Information Systems Limited and Motorola. Aﬃliates of multi-
national companies together account for 22 percent of the industry’s total
revenues. There are twenty-four large software companies that are publicly
traded on the Indian stock exchanges.7 Three of these—Infosys, Satyam,
and Wipro—are also listed on the U.S. stock exchanges.
Compare the industrial organization of the software industry to that of
the Indian economy as a whole reported in tables 5.2 and 5.3. The role of
the private sector looms much larger than that of the (absent) public sector
in the software industry than it does in the economy at large. There are
large, dominant software ﬁrms that have emerged—separating the wheat
from the chaﬀ, as it were—and this has happened through the normal
forces of global competition. Three of the ﬁve most successful companies
in the software industry—TCS, Wipro, and Satyam—were launched by
business groups and remain aﬃliated to these groups.8 Whereas the ab-
sence of capital barriers to entry characterizes the industry, reputation, the
forte of those groups that have succeeded, poses a formidable barrier to en-
try. Further, from the fact that multinationals have not been able to dis-
place the domestic group companies, we can conjecture that the reputation
of the former is probably based at least in part on some hard-to-replicate
ability to run a software company in India.
5.6.4 The Success of the Indian Software Industry
The case of the Indian software industry provides a contrasting picture
to the received wisdom that primarily emphasizes the ills of concentrated
ownership.9Here, we provide some broad data to support the claim that the
software industry is, in fact, a success story despite the ubiquity of con-
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7. There were also other software companies that are publicly listed, but these have very
small amounts of sales.
8. A fourth company, Infosys, has a very high level of insider ownership even though it is
not aﬃliated with a business group.
9. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) used U.S. data to argue that the monitoring beneﬁts
of concentrated ownership declined beyond a certain threshold level of concentrated owner-
ship. A more recent literature on corporate governance around the world points to the ex-
ploitation of minority shareholders by controlling concentrated owners as being a prevalent
problem (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
have argued that concentrated ownership has resulted in the onset of “Canadian disease,”
which they associate with slower growth, lower innovation, and other forms of noncompeti-
tive malaise.centrated ownership. Why do we think of this as a success? In contrast to
the lackluster performance of the Indian economy as a whole, the perfor-
mance of the Indian software industry has been impressive.10 The indus-
try’s total revenues in 2002 stood at $10.2 billion, and it grew at more than
40 percent per year during the 1990s. The industry accounted for $7.7 bil-
lion in exports in 2002, which was a signiﬁcant portion of the approxi-
mately $73.3 billion total exports of goods and services from India in that
year. One indication of technical prowess is that ﬁve of the nine software
development centers in the world with capability maturity model (CMM)
level 5 ratings, the highest ratings on the predominant quality scale devel-
oped for software at Carnegie-Mellon University, were located in India.
Companies like General Electric, Citicorp, and IBM had their only CMM-
certiﬁed operations in India rather than in the United States.11 According
to a report prepared by the international consulting ﬁrm McKinsey for the
National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM),
an industry trade association, the industry is expected to grow to $77 bil-
lion by 2008, accounting for 7 percent of India’s gross domestic product
(GDP), 33 percent of its foreign exchange inﬂows, and four million jobs. By
all these measures, software industry is the crown jewel of India’s postin-
dependence economy.
While this establishes that the Indian software industry has done well
relative to any sensible domestic benchmark, two other benchmarks are
worth considering. Consider, ﬁrst, comparisons with U.S. software com-
panies, and then comparisons of the Indian industry with itself, as it were,
over time.
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10. This history relies on the following sources: De Long and Nanda (2002), Heeks (1996),
Ghemawat (1999), NASSCOM (2002, 2003), Kennedy (2001), and Kuemmerle (2003).
Some aggregate performance indices for the country are worth keeping in mind to interpret
the software industry numbers. At the macro level, India’s overall economic performance dur-
ing the postindependence years can only be characterized as relatively poor. For example, the
United Nations’ Human Development Report of 2002 ranks India 124 among the 173 coun-
tries. According to the statistics reported by the Planning Commission of the Government of
India, the country’s gross national product (GNP) grew at annual average rate of approxi-
mately 4 percent between 1951 and 1990. This rate increased to approximately 6 percent in
the postreform years of 1990 to 2002. India’s population grew signiﬁcantly to 1.05 billion by
2002. While government spending on public education was more around 3 percent of GNP, a
disproportionate amount of this went to supporting higher education. According to the In-
dian government’s 2001 Census of India, the adult illiteracy rate stood at 34.6 percent in 2001.
Agriculture still remained the dominant source of income for a very signiﬁcant portion of the
population, and there were signiﬁcant levels of unemployment and underemployment. Per
capita GNP in 2001 stood at approximately $450. A caveat to this interpretation is that, in the
two decades leading to 2000, India’s cumulative average growth rate was second only to
China’s in this time period. Our reading is that it was a good performance, but not stellar
enough to alleviate the suﬀering of the Indian masses. In a recent analysis, De Long (2001)
argues that India was in the middle of the pack of countries that he analyzes over longer time
periods.
11. It may be that quality concerns are greater when a ﬁrm is located in an environment with
a reputation for poor governance and poor quality products. Perhaps U.S. ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it
necessary to seek certiﬁcation of this sort.Table 5.9compares the largest Indian software companies with some of
the largest U.S. software companies in terms of revenues, employees, prof-
itability, and market capitalization, all as of 2002. Indian companies are
clearly not as large as some of the largest U.S. software ﬁrms, such as CSC,
Accenture, and EDS, in terms of revenues or manpower. However, in
terms of proﬁtability, Indian ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly better than their U.S.
counterparts. The stock market valuations of Indian companies, despite
their smaller size, are often larger than the market capital of the U.S.
ﬁrms.12
Consider, now, the industry’s evolution over time. Table 5.10 shows the
time series of the total activity of the Indian software industry from 1988
to 2002. The industry had a total revenue of 0.7 billion Indian rupees in
1988, and the proportion of exports to domestic sales was 41 percent. By
2002, the industry grew to a size of 365 billion rupees, with exports ac-
counting for 76 percent. This is driven by the rising importance of oﬀ-
shore services (51 percent of export revenues in 2002 from 5 percent in
1991), the value-added part of the Indian software ﬁrms’ oﬀerings. This,
in turn, is a reﬂection of gradually developed reputations for reliability
and high quality of services, starting from a base of primarily bodyshop-
ping (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2000). By 2000, the United States accounted for
66 percent of the total exports of the industry, and the United Kingdom
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Table 5.9 A comparison of the large U.S. and Indian software companies
Revenues Operating No.  of  Market 
(June 2002,  margin  employees  capitalization 
$ million) (June 2002, %) (June 2002) (October 2002, $ million)
U.S. companies
Accenture 11,600 3.9 75,000 12,400
CSC 11,500 4.7 67,000 4,800
EDS 22,300 10.3 143,000 6,370
KPMG Consulting 2,368 5.6 9,300 1,240
Sapient 217 n.a. 2,427 123
Indian companies
HCL Tech 340 28.1 5,587 1,209
Infosys 571 32.1 10,470 7,140
Satyam 421 26.7 9,532 1,370
TCS 810 25 19,000 8,100
Wipro 734 24.5 13,800 6,340
Source: Adapted from NASSCOM Newsline, November 2002.
Note: n.a.  not available.
12. Software industry market capitalization on Indian stock exchanges rose from $4 billion
in January 1999 to a high of $90 billion and then, following the NASDAQ crash and its 
ripple eﬀect in India, settled at $55 billion by mid-2000.accounted for the second-largest share of exports, at 14 percent. Of the
Fortune 500 U.S. companies, 185 were customers of the Indian software
services industry.
This smorgasbord of data leaves us relatively convinced that, despite the
ubiquity of concentrated ownership, it is hard to tell a story of a sclerotic
industry, engulfed with rent-seeking behavior and in its death throes. Quite
the contrary. It is also instructive to note that direct measures of corporate
governance, which we turn to below, also do not yield predictions consis-
tent with the predicted dismal eﬀects of concentrated ownership.
The Indian software industry, on average, appears to follow better cor-
porate governance practices relative to the rest of the Indian industry, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that globalization puts pressure on companies
to improve their governance to global standards. Some data from Credit
Lyonnais Securities Analysis (CLSA; 2001) supports this assessment of the
current state of Indian corporate governance. The data are from a set of
questions regarding corporate governance administered to 482 companies
in twenty-four emerging markets in 2001. The companies are generally the
ones of greater interest to foreign investors, typically characterized by
some subset of the following characteristics: large size, greater equity ﬂoat,
and foreign listings. When we ranked countries by the mean corporate gov-
ernance score constructed by CLSA, we found that India ranked in about
the middle. Since most countries in these data have poor average corporate
governance (with some exceptions like Hong Kong and Singapore), and
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Table 5.10 India’s software exports, domestic sales, and imports 
(Rs. billion/U.S. $ million)
Exports
Time period Rs. US$ Domestic sales Exports/total sales (%)
1987–88 0.70 52 1.00 41
1990–91 2.50 128 2.25 52
1991–92 4.30 164 3.20 57
1992–93 6.70 225 4.90 57
1993–94 10.20 330 6.95 59
1994–95 15.30 485 10.70 59
1995–96 25.20 735 16.70 60
1996–97 39.00 1,110 25.00 61
1997–98 65.30 1,790 35.80 64
1998–99 109.00 2,650 49.50 68
1999–2000 171.50 4,000 94.10 70
2000–2001 283.50 6,230 98.90 74
2001–2 365.00 7,680 115.00 76
Source: Adapted from Ghemawat (1999), p. 20. Data from Heeks (1996) and NASSCOM.
Note: The ﬁgures for the domestic software activity do not include in-house development of
software by end users, which is presumed to be a considerable amount.since the selected companies are generally the better governed ones, this
conﬁrms the characterization oﬀered above.
The same CLSA data, however, also point out that the corporate gover-
nance ratings of the software ﬁrms are higher than those of other Indian
ﬁrms. The mean ratings for software ﬁrms (of which there are eight in the
CLSA data) and for nonsoftware ﬁrms (of which there are seventy-two)
are, respectively, 64.3 and 54.7 (minimum of 0 and maximum of 100), with
the diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.02. The medians
are, similarly, 62.9 and 53.8, with the diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant with
a p-value of 0.2.
The data also conﬁrm that software ﬁrms are, on average, more exposed
to global competition than other Indian ﬁrms. To ratify this assertion, we
supplemented CLSA data with a variety of indicators of global competi-
tion. Software ﬁrms are more likely to be traded on a U.S. stock exchange
( p-value 0.02) and on the London Stock Exchange ( p-value 0.08) and
more likely to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (p-value 0.01).
Software ﬁrms garner a higher percentage of their revenues through ex-
ports (p-value 0.01), are more likely to employ foreign talent in senior
managerial positions (p-value 0.01), and are somewhat more likely to em-
ploy a Big 5 accounting ﬁrm (p-value 0.12).13
Finally, having established that the Indian software industry outper-
forms domestic benchmarks (in terms of proﬁtability, market capitaliza-
tion, and corporate governance), outperforms U.S. benchmarks, and is
improving over time, consider some evidence that, while least precise, is
perhaps farthest reaching. The social transformation brought about by the
rise of the software industry is diﬃcult to exaggerate. Most compellingly,
Indian talents have role models of entrepreneurship—from both de novo
bootstrapped ﬁrms and from business group oﬀshoots—to spur them for-
ward (Khanna and Palepu 2004). Individuals, in both rural and urban set-
tings, are much closer to having the information they need to be “empow-
ered” (Das 2000). Indeed, rural India is being transformed by the roadside
availability of computing power (in much the same way that a previous dis-
semination of franchised telephone kiosk services around the country rev-
olutionized telecommunication service provision). It is thus diﬃcult to es-
cape the conclusion that the positive spillovers from the Indian software
industry exceed, perhaps vastly, the direct beneﬁts internalized by stake-
holders of the industry.
5.6.5 A Tale of Two Software Firms
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of two very suc-
cessful ﬁrms in the Indian software industry: TCS, aﬃliated with the Tata
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13. However, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between software and nonsoft-
ware ﬁrms in the proportion of equity held by institutional investors.group, and Infosys, a new entrepreneurial venture arising out of the op-
portunities provided by the new economic environment. Elsewhere, we
have argued that there are two qualitatively diﬀerent “solutions” to the in-
stitutional voids that hamper entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The
ﬁrst is for incumbent groups to leverage their internal access to capital and
talent to start new ventures—this is the TCS story—and the second is for
aspirants to tap into external institutions outside the country—this is the
Infosys story (Khanna and Palepu 2004).
The stories of these two ﬁrms show how group-aﬃliated ﬁrms coexist
successfully with independent entrepreneurial ﬁrms in this industry. It also
demonstrates that the success of group-aﬃliated ﬁrms is attributable not to
their ability to exploit government connections but to their ability to suc-
cessfully exploit entrepreneurial opportunities in the economy. Finally, not
only is it not the case that the group, the embodiment of concentrated own-
ership, deterred the entry of the unaﬃliated ﬁrm, but it actually laid the
groundwork for a vast array of subsequent entrants.
The founding of TCS in 1968 marks the birth of the ﬁrst Indian domes-
tic software ﬁrm at a time when IBM was riding herd in India.14 Tata Con-
sultancy Services was set up by India’s oldest business group, the house of
Tata, by pooling together management talent from existing Tata compa-
nies to create a new entity to act as an information technology bureau for
various members of the Tata group. In two senses, it is the prototypical ex-
ample of the ﬁlling of institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 1999,
2000b,c), that is, of the creation by diversiﬁed business groups of internal
solutions to compensate for the absence of external specialized intermedi-
aries (institutional voids). The voids in question here refer to the absence
of intermediaries facilitating the pooling of talent to launch such a com-
pany and the absence of an entity to provide information technology ser-
vices to service the corporate demands of the time.
Armed with the reputation of the Tata group and its track record in In-
dia, TCS sought business overseas, turning successfully to secure an al-
liance with Burroughs Corporation in the United States, whereby Bur-
roughs would secure programming contacts and TCS would execute them.
Under newly appointed chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) F. C. Kohli, TCS
built up a credible list of major Indian customers between 1969 and 1973.15
It is important to realize that India’s distortionary foreign exchange reg-
ulations played a key role in prompting TCS to solicit business overseas.
Foreign exchange was needed to pay for importing the hardware on which
TCS performed its software programming services. It is also worth noting
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14. The data, though not the interpretation, for the few paragraphs on the founding of TCS
are from Kennedy (2001).
15. It is true that the MIT-trained Kohli’s own contacts in the United States, as part of the
IEEE association, no doubt played a facilitating role in securing contacts. But of course the
Tatas had the reputation to attract someone of Kohli’s stature in the ﬁrst instance.that such cross-border arrangements have been common in the history of
the Tata group. For example, its ventures in the late 1990s included joint
venture agreements with the likes of AT&T, NTT, Honeywell, Jardine
Matheson, (the then) Daimler Benz, and numerous others. Elsewhere we
have argued that the network of joint venture agreements represent credi-
ble commitments not to engage in short-term opportunistic behavior to-
ward the marginal joint venture partner, and that the network itself is fa-
cilitated by the diverse (cross-industry) scope of the Tata group (Khanna
and Palepu 1997).
Experience gained domestically and through Burroughs meant that
TCS was well positioned when another distortionary Indian regulation—
the requirement of divesting suﬃcient equity to local partners—forced
IBM (and several other multinationals) out of India in 1977. A separate en-
tity—Tata Burroughs (later Tata Infotech)—was created to focus on busi-
ness based on the Burroughs platform, while TCS decided to focus on the
rising IBM platform in its outside-India work. A U.S. oﬃce was opened in
1979 to solicit business, and, with successful projects for various banks,
American Express, IBM, and others under its proverbial belt, TCS had es-
tablished the industry, and its position, by the mid-1980s.
In contrast to TCS, Infosys Technologies, another of India’s software
success stories, is the prototypical example of building a business by lever-
aging external (i.e., non-India-speciﬁc) institutions to compensate for do-
mestic (India-speciﬁc) institutional voids. Narayan Murthy, the individual
most associated with Infosys today, mused that the biggest challenge fac-
ing Infosys was “running a ﬁrst-world ﬁrm in a third world country” (De
Long and Nanda 2002, p. 9). Infosys was founded in 1981 by seven entre-
preneurs, all ex-employees of Patni Computer Systems (itself one of the en-
trants into the post-IBM-withdrawal vacuum). Its initial capital consisted
of approximately $1,000 of personal savings and no Tata-like reputation to
leverage. However, at least one of the founders, Murthy, had his profes-
sional outlook sensitized to the importance of personal incentives by his
own stint working outside India (in Paris).
Infosys struggled, teetering on the precipice of bankruptcy in 1989, un-
til a foreign exchange crisis forced India to “open up.” Reasons cited for In-
fosys’s early diﬃculties can reasonably be traced to pre-1991 institutional
voids in product markets (lack of availability of quality hardware), capital
markets (limited availability of ﬁnancing for de novo entrepreneurs), and
labor markets (visa restrictions preventing cross-border talent mobility). A
lot of these constraints were removed when barriers to the ﬂow of people,
capital, and ideas were relaxed so that Infosys software engineers could be
relocated relatively easily to their customer sites, Infosys management did
not have to spend excessive time circumventing regulations in New Delhi,
foreign know-how regarding the industry was accessible, and equity capi-
tal could be accessed locally through listings (which Infosys did in 1993).
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more fundamental ones remained. A Forbes article commented that there
was a “perception that a smart, honest, reputable company could never
come out of a country where cows still run in the street” (Pfeiﬀer 1999,
quoted in De Long and Nanda 2002, p. 13). A 1999 NASDAQ listing was
designed to ameliorate informational problems that hampered Infosys
from reaching blue-chip companies in the global market. Several execu-
tives at Infosys and its competitors, and several regulators at SEBI (India’s
SEC equivalent), commented to us, for example, that the NASDAQ listing
was designed primarily to gain credibility with customers and to permit the
issuance of dollar-denominated stock options to compete in global mar-
kets for talent.16 For a company that, by this time, was not liquidity con-
strained, as we have demonstrated elsewhere (Khanna and Palepu 2004),
raising capital was not the reason to list overseas. Securities and Exchange
Board of India member Jayanth Verma’s comment to us regarding the
spate of software listings overseas that followed is instructive: “The indus-
try that probably needs capital the least, went after the international capi-
tal markets most aggressively....  I n  fact many of these companies don’t
know what to do with the capital they raised....  T h e  p r e ssures that the
capital markets can put on a company that doesn’t need to raise capital are
next to nothing.”
A few ﬁnal points are worth noting. First, TCS’s moves arguably laid
the foundation for the industry’s development. Azim Premji, founder of
Wipro, India’s second largest software company and an NYSE-listed com-
pany, commented, “The legacy of the early pioneers—Tata Consultancy
Services—was a growing number of foreign companies favorably im-
pressed about what Indian companies could do in software” (Ramamurti
2001). Thus, TCS, launched by the Tata group, far from deterring entry, ap-
pears to have facilitated it.
5.7 Discussion: The (Socially Useful) Persistence
of Concentrated Ownership
In this section, we argue that the persistence of concentrated ownership
is, in fact, a robust feature of many, if not most, emerging markets. The
story of the Indian software industry, and the (socially) useful role that
business groups with concentrated ownership play in it, is not an artifact
of serendipitous outcomes but has generalizable aspects to it. In contrast,
the literature’s current focus on the dark side of concentrated ownership,
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16. Note, however, that the international listing was not feasible until Infosys had a stable
track record. As Azim Premji, CEO of rival Wipro, commented, “It is also important to re-
member that Indian companies built their expertise serving domestic customers before ven-
turing abroad” (Ramamurti 2001). Even TCS ventured overseas after it had a strong domes-
tic track record.to the virtually complete exclusion of the positive aspects, has the poten-
tial to understate the beneﬁcial aspects of such ownership, especially in
emerging markets.
Consider other instances in space and time that are consistent with this
idea of the socially productive longevity of concentrated ownership. We
have focused on Chile in earlier work on the sustainability of business
groups (Khanna and Palepu 2000b) because Chile is the one country in
modern economic history that has arguably undergone one of the most
rapid movements toward a market economy, starting from the socialist so-
ciety left behind by Salvador Allende in 1973 (following his overthrow by
the right-wing general Augosto Pinochet). In particular, Chilean markets
are widely celebrated as being the best in Latin America, especially since
1990. Thus, if one were to see business groups atrophy as external markets
develop, this is where one ought to ﬁnd the eﬀect most glaringly. Our study
conﬁrmed that the value of business group aﬃliation fell during the ten
years between 1987 and 1997. But business group aﬃliation, even in the rel-
atively developed markets of the late 1990s, continued to be valuable. Our
interpretation was that group capabilities, under attack in this instance
since 1973 and especially since 1990, fall slowly.
We supplemented this by detailed ﬁeldwork in nine of Chile’s largest
groups over the same time period (Khanna and Palepu 1999). It is impor-
tant to note that these were not the ten best-performing groups. Here we
found that these groups bucked the trend, so to speak, not only by im-
proving their performance over this time period but also by increasing the
trend toward greater concentration in ownership, greater family control,
and greater diversiﬁcation, all allegedly correlates of the deleterious eﬀects
of concentrated ownership. Similar ﬁeld evidence was obtained and re-
ported from India in the 1990–97 time period.
The parallels with business groups in history are uncanny and relatively
unexplored (Jones and Khanna 2003). Here we draw largely on the work
on multinational trading companies in the 1800s and 1900s by Geoﬀrey
Jones (2000). Primarily around the mid-1800s, British trading houses in
particular (and trading houses originating elsewhere in Europe to a lesser
extent) were cross-border structural analogs of the sorts of contemporary
business groups that one observes in Chile, India, and elsewhere (Khanna
2000). In these trading companies, which Jones describes as business
groups, the merchant house was the “core” and was tied through a medley
of contracts, informal and formal, to a series of separately publicly quoted
(traded) aﬃliates around the world, which operated in very diverse indus-
tries.
Examples of such British trading companies included the Inchcape/
Mackinnon group, a shipping enterprise spread over Asia and Australia,
with a trading business in the Gulf, India, and Africa, and plantations
in India. Another was Jardine Matheson, which originated as an opium
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heritage to source talent, evolved into a multinational business group with
operations in China and outposts in Japan, the United States, South
Africa, and Peru in diverse services and manufacturing businesses, as well
as an active venture capital business in mining worldwide.
Some funds were drawn from British (and other) expatriate savings in
the colonies and from the London capital markets, and a lot of funds were
sourced locally. That is, there was the structural issue of controlling and
minority shareholders that we have already discussed as a hallmark of con-
temporary groups. Yet, as Jones points out, while the potential for minor-
ity shareholder exploitation existed in spades, there were very few such
cases. Why? His answer is that reputation mattered, and these business
groups sought to build trust by doing things like forgoing commissions
(owed to the core ﬁrm by the aﬃliates as compensation for management
services rendered) when times were bad. The groups referred to a “moral
responsibility” toward their aﬃliates. Thus we have an instance where con-
centrated ownership appears to have exercised self-restraint, even amid a
weak corporate control environment, a factor that was probably associated
with its longevity.
Consider also the adaptability of this historical business group, another
reason why the concentrated ownership has persisted. Continuing the ex-
amples above, the Inchcape group gradually divested from India in the late
1960s and 1970s as that country became less attractive, and also withdrew
from the Middle East and Africa, ultimately reconﬁguring itself as a group
invested in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and Australia. Jardines and
Swires recovered from rather drastic business setbacks, including the Com-
munist revolution in China, reconﬁgured themselves as Hong Kong–based
groups, and entered numerous new businesses. Such reconﬁgurations can
be observed even in contemporary groups. The Tata group started, for
example, with steel and airlines and insurance in the 1800s, had to undergo
nationalization and conﬁscation of several of its major businesses (includ-
ing airlines and insurance), built up and eventually divested major busi-
nesses in consumer products, and most recently successfully entered
automobiles and software. Thus, TCS, discussed above, is a recent diversi-
ﬁcation of the Tata group. Similarly, the roughly $4 billion Ayala group in
the Philippines started with distilleries, evolved into a real estate and ﬁ-
nancial services group as of the 1990s, and most recently emerged as a ma-
jor and very successful player in mobile telephony (Khanna, Palepu, and
Vargas 2004).
Groups, and the concentrated ownership that they represent, whether in
history or in contemporary emerging markets, are robust forms of business
organizations. They potentially last centuries, changing their footprint and
functional form, and weathering severe shocks. Whereas egregious viola-
tions and crony capitalism by groups are often reported (e.g., Fisman’s
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actually far more numerous, even though lacking the drama of exploita-
tion.
As a coda, it is worth commenting on the implicit counterfactual that
underpins our assertion that groups are socially productive organizational
forms.One should ask, what would happen if there were no groups? Would
organized commerce happen in quite the way that it does in emerging mar-
kets, when the specialized intermediation needed to facilitate arm’s-length
transactions between buyers and sellers in all manner of markets are miss-
ing? We think not. Such a world would be closer to ﬁrst-best, but is also
patently unrealistic. Then, a critic of groups might say, groups are sensible
responses to the absence of specialized intermediation at a point in time,
but their very presence deters the emergence of intermediaries. Therefore
groups are self-perpetuating. There is some truth to this (Khanna 2000),
but it is a characterization that rings more true for extreme concentration
of groups as in South Korea or South Africa, than for the “median” emerg-
ing market.
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Comment Ashoka Mody
In this paper, the authors oﬀer a panoramic view of Indian business over
the past century. They reach three conclusions. First, at any point in time,
a small number of family-based business groups, spanning a number of
lines of activity, have typically dominated the Indian (nonagricultural)
private sector. Second, this dominance has not necessarily meant the per-
sistence of particular groups: there has been signiﬁcant turnover in the
identity of the major groups. And, ﬁnally, more recently, professionally
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tributed to the IMF.managed “specialist” ﬁrms have coexisted in socially beneﬁcial competi-
tive relationships with family-owned ﬁrms.
The main analytical theme underlying these important observations is
the value of family-based business groups in emerging markets. The au-
thors caution against the tendency to focus on the “dark side” of concen-
tration of economic resources and power. Instead, they argue that “insti-
tutional voids” in emerging markets render family ownership of groups of
ﬁrms an important mechanism for mobilizing necessary resources for
growth.
In this comment, I focus my discussion on two themes. First, owing to
the ubiquity of family-owned business groups in emerging markets, a
deeper understanding requires scholarship to move to the diﬀerentiation
of such groups across countries and over time. Group characteristics and
country conditions determine the value of family-owned businesses in de-
livering economic growth and aiding the transformation of the economy.
Second, applying this approach of diﬀerentiating both group and country
features, I review the role of business communities in India and reach a
more pessimistic conclusion on their transformational role during the past
century.
Consider, ﬁrst, the interaction between business groups and the state of
a country’s development. In a comparison of South Korea and Taiwan, I
have argued that South Korea deliberately fostered the formation of busi-
ness groups to acquire new capabilities and thus dynamically change its
“factor” endowments to transition to a higher growth path (Mody 1990).
The business groups were new—largely a post–World War II phenome-
non—and were a calculated eﬀort to break out of a low-growth trajectory.
Even in the late 1980s, when this research was originally conducted, some
of the Korean business groups were already among the world’s largest
ﬁrms (placing them in Fortune magazine’s list of the ﬁfty biggest interna-
tional ﬁrms). Since then they have grown further to establish valuable in-
ternational brand names and occupy prominent positions in several key in-
dustrial activities.
Thus, in the Korean context, business conglomerates performed the
function of substituting for missing capital and information markets, as
emphasized especially by Oliver Williamson in his many writings, and the
internal resource-allocation mechanisms generated growth that might
otherwise not have occurred. The result was that Korea, which lagged be-
hind Taiwan by most development indicators, progressed rapidly to catch
up and even move ahead of Taiwan in certain dimensions.
The comparison of Korea with Taiwan is interesting precisely because
Taiwan has itself been such a dynamic economy over the same period. Tai-
wan was not without its own conglomerates but relied during the 1970s
and 1980s primarily on entrepreneurship fostered in relatively small ﬁrms.
These smaller ﬁrms delivered impressive growth, drawing on the econ-
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Taiwanese ﬁrms have themselves grown to be large conglomerates, also
with their own international brand names.
The Korea-Taiwan comparison oﬀers many lessons and is also subject to
important caveats. The structure of business enterprise can have a signiﬁ-
cant bearing on aggregate growth—micro structures can have macro im-
plications. But there is no simple formula that relates business organization
to macroeconomic performance. Thus, as Khanna and Palepu argue, con-
centrated ownership can be “socially useful” and the persistence of such
concentration can be valuable, but both theory and practice suggest more
nuanced messages of country and time variation in their performance.
Even in the context of Korea, the economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 revealed
substantial ineﬃciencies in the operation of the chaebol conglomerates,
forcing changes in both private and regulatory approaches to their man-
agement.1
Thus, under the premise that business groups respond to the context of
the country’s economic conditions, the performance of Indian business
can be viewed broadly over three time periods. The ﬁrst of these periods
commences some time in the late nineteenth century and runs through to
India’s independence in 1947. The Parsi business houses were pioneers in
the textile industry. India’s ﬁrst cotton textile mill, the Bombay Spinning
and Weaving Company, was established in 1851 (Gadgil 1944) by Cowasji
Nanabhoy Daver, who, Desai (1968) notes, had been active in cotton ex-
port and also established three banks between 1845 and 1861. Thus, the
concept—and practice—of business conglomerates with internal capital
markets goes back a long way.
The question of interest, then, is how well these early business conglom-
erates performed and what their legacy was for the further evolution of In-
dian industry. In describing the contributions of the Parsis, Desai (1968)
notes that Parsi entrepreneurship was based in Surat and Bombay. He con-
cludes (p. 314) that “Wherever we look among pioneers, they are found to
come from or be related to a small circle of shippers, shipbuilders, traders
and ﬁnanciers in Bombay; the landlords and manufacturers of Surat-
Navsari do not ﬁgure among them.” Desai attributes the success of the
Bombay Parsis to “their close connections with the British” (p. 315), which
allowed them to share in British-controlled foreign trade and to form links
to British cotton textile manufacturing in India. Thus, early Indian eﬀorts
at factory-based manufacturing, while pioneering, were made in the space
provided by British entrepreneurs.
Fast-forwarding, Gadgil (1944, p. 198) concludes that industrial pro-
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1. At the same time, continued robust performance of the Korean economy has depended
on a high-quality and industrially literate workforce combined with internationally sophisti-
cated infrastructure.gress in India up until the start of the First World War in 1914 must be
judged to have been “very small,” especially if the decline in traditional in-
dustries is taken into account. Taking stock of progress made in the early
1920s, Gadgil once again states: “Yet the main features of the situation are
not substantially changed. Organized industries as yet play too small a part
in the national economy, and even in the industrial population a very large
proportion is engaged in the simpler seasonal, miscellaneous or repair in-
dustries” (p. 294). He then goes on to note: “Indian public opinion had al-
ways clamoured for active assistance to industries being given and at last
Government appointed in 1916 an Industrial Commission, speciﬁcally to
inquire as to how direction encouragement to the development of indus-
tries could be given by the Government” (p. 323).
Thus, a reading of the preindependence history of industrial develop-
ment points to some signiﬁcant achievements, including the establishment
of the Tata Iron and Steel Company in 1907 and its initial output of steel
in 1913, but the overall picture is one of limited progress, with the domes-
tic business community dependent on its relationship with British business
and increasingly calling for active government support. It is not surprising,
therefore, that a remarkable document, popularly known as the “Bombay
Plan,” was written just before independence in 1944 and 1945 by a group
of Indian industrialists, among them J. R. D. Tata and G. D. Birla, who
went on to lead the two biggest Indian business groups in the ﬁrst few
decades after independence in 1947 (Thakurdas et al. 1944). The Bombay
Plan called on government support for industrialization, including a direct
role for the government in the production of capital goods, foreshadowing
postindependence Indian planning, typically considered an outgrowth of
socialist ideas drawn either from the Soviet Union or the so-called Fabian
socialists.
Khanna and Palepu go on to recount the story of the second important
period, from 1947 to the early 1990s. Scholars continue to debate the end
point of this period, but its crucial feature is the collaboration of the big
business houses with the government in sustaining an enervating environ-
ment. The government chose to control industrial growth in onerous ways,
and big business readily acquiesced in this relationship, choosing to make
money through its control over scarce licenses to operate. Those that
played this game well prospered. It is the case, as Khanna and Palepu doc-
ument, that new houses emerged during this period, but whether such
emergence can be regarded as an entrepreneurial success in any true sense
of the term is open to question.
The ﬁnal period, that of economic liberalization, which continues to the
present, is the most interesting. Here, as Khanna and Palepu highlight, a
new generation of entrepreneurs emerged. They were not tied to tradi-
tional business groups and, rather than originating from shipbuilders,
traders, and ﬁnanciers, they were often the children of public-sector oﬃ-
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ready to exploit the lack of government regulation of a new “software” in-
dustry. The Tatas also saw early opportunities in software and developed a
successful business, but the sprouting of entrepreneurs from middle-class
families with salaried parents is a noteworthy development in the evolution
of Indian entrepreneurship. A similar phenomenon has since occurred in
the pharmaceutical industry.
This is a moment of high expectation for India, one that poses several
questions for students of business. Will some of the successful businesses
evolve into conglomerates in the style of Korean conglomerates and use in-
ternal capital markets to force the pace of growth? Or is that an antiquated
model, given Indian ﬁrms’ access to world capital markets, as demon-
strated by the ability of several to list on international stock exchanges? Of
course, the challenge to growth may come from internal infrastructure, hu-
man capital, and regulatory bottlenecks, which may imply surrendering
the independence that the most innovative ﬁrms have enjoyed and which
may generate a war of attrition of the type that has stymied Indian business
in the past. Or the Indian lead in the knowledge of English and skilled en-
gineers may be tested by China. Another stocktaking, another paper!
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